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LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES 
HOWARD SCHWEBER∗ 
I.  LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
“A pregnant woman walks into a bar.”  That is not the beginning of a 
tasteless joke, it was the beginning of a criminal prosecution.  The (very 
visibly, eight-month) pregnant woman in question is known to the State of 
Wisconsin as Deborah J.Z.1 This was one of several cases that made head-
lines in the late 1990s.  A survey of cases between 1973 and 2007 finds 418 
instances of prosecutions brought against pregnant women based on claims 
of conduct that posed a risk of harm to the fetus.  The conduct in these cases 
ranged from illegal drug use (eighty-four percent of cases) to refusal of 
medical treatment or refusal of delivery by caesarian section.  The defend-
ants, unsurprisingly, have disproportionately been women of color and/or 
lower socioeconomic status.2 
These moves involve an intersection of a number of elements: abortion 
politics, the increasing popularity of the idea of “fetal rights,” and the gen-
eral surrender of privacy to government authority imposed as a condition of 
interactions—voluntary or not—with state agencies.3  Yet while these polit-
ical factors may explain the increase in the enactment of statutes and the 
conduct of prosecutors, they leave out an important conceptual element that 
makes it possible to readily translate political attitudes into legal arguments.  
The discussion of fetal rights is a good example.  Katha Pollitt sums up the 
critique of such arguments nicely.  “Pro-choice activists rightly argue that 
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 1.  The woman’s real name has long since been released in the press, but I see no reason to 
repeat that violation of privacy here—a point which arguably has some relevance to this entire 
discussion. 
 2.  See Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant 
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public 
Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 300 (2013); see also Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Looking 
for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA 
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Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (2000). 
 3.  See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
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tional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 931 (1995). 
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antiabortion and fetal-rights advocates grant fetuses more rights than wom-
en.  A point less often made is that they grant fetuses more rights than two-
year-olds—the right, for example, to a safe, healthy place to live.”4  The 
idea of fetal rights is one that has never been recognized under either the 
United States or state constitutions, although that has not stopped state leg-
islatures from employing the idea, and someday courts may decide to adopt 
that vocabulary as well.  But as Pollitt’s comment points out, even if courts 
were to accept the idea that fetuses have rights, those rights would have to 
be balanced against the undoubted rights of persons to bodily liberty.  The 
outcomes in particular cases may be inconsistent with liberal norms, but the 
language of traditional, negative, liberal “rights” provides a perfectly ade-
quate basis for criticizing those outcomes even if something called “fetal 
rights” were to be added to the discursive mix.5  To put the matter another 
way, the criminal prosecution or preventive detention of a pregnant woman 
seen drinking in public would have been unthinkable fifty years ago.  What 
changed? 
It is possible that critics of state intervention in pregnancy are mistak-
en to focus on the case as sui generis.  Far from representing an abandon-
ment of governing norms, the logic justifying state action in these cases is 
inherent in the model of the public/private divide that currently informs 
American legal discourse. 
Focusing on the public/private divide, rather than on the “right to pri-
vacy,” is an approach that turns away from the language of rights to a 
broader consideration of the principles that legitimize state action in the 
first instance.  The power of the state is not limited to the vindication of 
rights, nor is it the case that the state’s interests necessarily give way any 
time a claim of right is asserted.  There are obviously profound questions of 
rights involved in this discussion, but their resolution takes place against a 
background understanding of “public” and “private” as categories of politi-
cal legitimation. 
The basic formulation of Millean liberalism is the idea of a private 
sphere, defined as the area of “self-directed” activities, meaning those that 
have no direct consequences for others except by their voluntary agreement.  
The idea that self-directed conduct is outside the reach of legitimate public 
                                                          
 4.  Katha Pollitt, “Fetal Rights”: A New Assault on Feminism, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE 
POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 285, 292 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri 
Umansky eds., 1998). 
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control is the central premise of liberalism.  This is not to say that Mill was 
anything like a modern libertarian.  For one thing, the conduct that is 
properly subject to public authority encompasses a broad range.  For anoth-
er, Mill was perfectly comfortable with the idea that there is a category of 
conduct that is a proper subject of social pressure even though it is not so 
consequential as to warrant coercive interventions.  Here again, however, 
the question turns on whether the conduct affects anyone other than the ac-
tor.6  The Millean liberal conception of the public/private divide has been 
the subject of endless and often fruitful critique on republican, feminist, and 
other grounds.  And there are certainly other conceptions of “privacy.”7  
But the basic idea that “public” means “affecting others” has been, and re-
mains, a central element of the legal conception of “privacy.” 
Returning to the case of Deborah J.Z., this observation identifies the 
underlying reasoning that justifies intervention.  The public understanding 
that drinking alcohol while pregnant poses a risk to the future-born child—
treated as an “other”—satisfies both the Millean requirement of other-
directed consequences and the police powers formulation of health, safety, 
welfare, and morals.  But that answer begs important questions. Similar 
prosecutions would have been considered outrageous fifty years earlier.  
What governing conceptions are at work in the proposition that a legislature 
can legitimately regulate the conduct of pregnant women in ways that 
would not have been considered reasonable in earlier eras? 
The answer, I will argue, is the emergence of a new legal epistemolo-
gy.  New ways of conceiving cause and effect, harm, and risk were incorpo-
rated into legal thinking, resulting in a reconfiguration of the public/private 
divide.  A similar expansion in the understanding of causation and harm had 
previously taken place in the 1930s.  In that period, a new model based on 
the idea of “markets” shattered older conceptions of privity and opened 
whole new categories of public interest and authority.  The market concep-
tion of the public/private divide was driven by the pervasiveness of new 
forms of economic activity in the structure of corporate industrial capital-
ism, and new ways of thinking promoted by the emergence of the social 
scientific disciplines.  In the 1970s, the new model was ecological.  Ideas of 
causation and harm were reconceived as descriptions of effects occurring 
within complex systems of interacting elements rather than discrete, partic-
ular events.  In this model, a pregnant woman ingesting alcohol is analo-
                                                          
 6.  JOHN STUART MILL, J.S. MILL: ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS (Classic Books Int’l. 
2010) (1851). 
 7.  Beatte Rössler identifies five distinct versions of the ideal of privacy, of which the most 
general is “a condition in which one is protected in various respects from the unwanted interfer-
ence of others.”  Beatte Rössler, Privacies: An Overview, in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL 
EVALUATIONS 1, 7–9 (Beatte Rössler ed., 2004). 
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gous to a polluter, as the cause of the harm or risk is conduct affecting the 
gestational environment rather than an act of physical violence.8 
What occurred in the 1930s and the 1970s is occurring again today, 
not in relation to either economic or biological understandings, but in terms 
of the legal epistemology that is employed in the conception of public and 
private information.  Now as then, new patterns of interaction and new 
ways of thinking threaten to undermine the coherence of a perceived under-
standing of the public/private divide.  The forces driving change, as always, 
are both empirical and intellectual.  Empirically, the driving force has been 
the rise of new technologies of communication that have permitted, if not 
required, entirely new ways of social and economic interaction.  Intellectu-
ally, the shift is to an understanding that people live simultaneously in a 
physically defined local environment and in the unbounded realm of net-
works.  These changes in the ways people live challenge the existing legal 
epistemology of privacy. 
There is an interesting historical story to be told here about the intel-
lectual dominance of particular fields.  The early decades of the 1900s were 
the period in which economics emerged as a central field of intellectual en-
deavor; the 1980s were the period in which the biological sciences are said 
to have displaced physics in the postwar intellectual pantheon, particularly 
with the dominance of evolutionary and genetic models (think of “genetic 
algorithms” in computational science).9  By the same token, it may be ar-
gued that we are living through a period in which the science(s) of infor-
mation are rapidly taking over as the dominant source of metaphors, mod-
els, and methods across a broad range of intellectual endeavors. 
II.  MARKETS AND ECOLOGIES 
A.  “For the Larger Benefit of All” 
The first modern shift in legal epistemology in the modern era was ev-
idenced by the change in reasoning that occurred between Lochner v. New 
                                                          
 8.  In 2014, Tennessee adopted a law permitting a woman to be charged with assault if she is 
found to have ingested narcotics outside of a treatment program while pregnant, if a subsequently 
born live child is found to have suffered harm, or exhibits drug dependency.  Assoc’d Press, Ten-
nessee: Governor Signs Bill Targeting Drug Use During Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/tennessee-governor-signs-bill-targeting-drug-use-during-
pregnancy.html.  A similar bill is under consideration in Oklahoma.  Oklahoma Watch & M. Scott 
Carter, Bill Would Penalize Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, KGOU (Mar. 7, 2015), 
kgou.org/post/bill-would-penalize-pregnant-women-who-use-drugs.  These bills may be taken as 
indications that an ecological conception of harm has become so internalized within legal dis-
course that it is no longer necessary to treat such claims as somehow separate from traditional cat-
egories. 
 9.  Freeman Dyson, Our Biotech Future, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 9, 2007), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/jul/19/our-biotech-future/. 
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York10 and the cases that accepted expanded notions of both state and feder-
al power in the 1930s.11 This momentous shift in constitutional doctrine has 
been studied and debated to death, with a significant amount of attention 
paid to the ways in which new legal doctrines reflected shifts in the under-
standing of the public/private divide.  Without either endorsing or disputing 
the main schools of thought about changes in legal doctrines, however, I 
want to examine the shift in thinking about fundamental concepts of causa-
tion and harm that were articulated in the process of arriving at those new 
legal principles.12 
In Lochner, as in the other cases of its period, the question of whether 
the State was properly asserting police powers was understood in terms of 
direct threats to the health or well-being of the actors immediately involved 
in a situation: workers facing immediate threats of injury, purchasers of po-
tentially unsafe or unwholesome products, or extraordinarily unhealthful 
working conditions.  Writing for the majority in Lochner, Justice Peckham 
rejected two kinds of claimed harms. The first included gradual, slowly-
accreting health effects from ordinary activities: “It is unfortunately true la-
bor, even in any department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of un-
healthiness.  But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative ma-
jorities?”13  Here, the slippery slope argument points to the danger (from 
Justice Peckham’s perspective) of allowing extended conceptions of health 
effects to be the basis for intervention.  The application of this argument 
drew Justice Harlan’s ire, as he pointed out that evidence was presented that 
baking was in fact an unwholesome occupation to an exceptional degree.  
Second, in a move Justice Holmes criticized, Justice Peckham rejected the 
idea that regulation of economic relations between individuals could be a 
matter of public “welfare”: “Viewed in the light of a purely labor law . . . a 
law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the 
                                                          
 10.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 11.  See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home Blgd. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).  
 12.  The discussion in this Paper does not seek to take any position on the controversies sur-
rounding the question of how we ought to understand Lochner v. New York, but seeks only to sug-
gest an observation that may or may not resonate with other readings.  A very partial list of those 
readings includes: DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS (1993); 
PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (Peter Charles Hoffer & 
N.E. H. Hull eds., 1998); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Sub-
stantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009); Howard 
Schweber, Lochner v. New York and the Challenge of Legal Historiography, 39 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 242 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
 13.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. 
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welfare of the public, and . . . the interest of the public is not in the slightest 
degree affected by such an act.”14 
It is striking to compare Lochner to the discussion of the minimum 
wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.15  For one thing, in West 
Coast Hotel Justice Hughes understood that negotiation for wages in a par-
ticular case takes place in the context of a general labor market that effec-
tively sets conditions for individual participants.  Second, Justice Hughes 
took for granted the continued existence of a social welfare system, and 
viewed the operation of private business in light of their relations to such 
public operations: 
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal posi-
tion with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively de-
fenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detri-
mental to their health and well being, but casts a direct burden for 
their support upon the community.  What these workers lose in 
wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay.  The bare cost of liv-
ing must be met. . . .  The community is not bound to provide 
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.16 
Justice Hughes emphasized the public interest in the overall conditions of 
the labor market taken as a whole system rather than focusing on the ques-
tion of the public interest in a particular employment relationship.  He stat-
ed: 
The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils 
of the “sweating system,” the exploiting of workers at wages so 
low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus mak-
ing their very helplessness the occasion of a most injurious com-
petition.  The legislature had the right to consider that its mini-
mum wage requirements would be an important aid in carrying 
out its policy of protection.17 
The point is emphasized repeatedly, as when Justice Hughes writes 
that the restrictions upheld in Muller v. Oregon18 were “not imposed solely 
for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all,”19 or quoted Holden v. 
Hardy20 for the proposition that the fact that the parties to a contract “are of 
full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the State of 
the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or 
                                                          
 14.  Id. at 57. 
 15.  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 16.  Id. at 399. 
 17.  Id. at 398–99. 
 18.  208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 19.  West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95 (quoting Muller, 208 U.S. at 422). 
 20.  169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
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where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be pro-
tected against himself.”21 
It was not only the conception of the employment that was reworked in 
response to a market model.  Equally, concepts of risk and probability, indi-
rect costs and consequences, and the consequences of inaction as well as 
action have dramatically expanded our shared understandings of social re-
sponsibility, reflected in areas such as tort law.22  The period from Lochner 
to Wickard v. Filburn23 was also the period of the emergence of profession-
alized social sciences, one of whose driving ideas was “interconnectedness” 
of different areas of social activity.24  The idea of an “economy” as some-
thing to be regulated, was a new addition to the vocabulary that made sen-
sible the idea that regulation of labor markets affected the public welfare of 
society writ large.  It could even be argued that the very existence of a na-
tional, or even a statewide, “economy” was the result of improvements in 
the technologies of communication and transportation that transformed the 
landscape—literally and figuratively—from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards. 
That shift in understanding reflected cultural and intellectual conse-
quences of the emergence of new forms of economic and social organiza-
tion that produced new ways of thinking about causation, harm, and com-
plex interactions.  In the economic arena, the shift was from viewing 
transactions as isolated, independent events to seeing “the economy” and 
“markets” as complex, interconnected systems in which events in one loca-
tion have ripple effects across a network of related interactions to produce 
effects in another.  For want of a better term, this might be deemed “market 
system” reasoning. 
B.  “Through Hindsight, Everything Is Foreseeable” 
Just as the market conception of public effects was at the heart of the 
1930s reconsideration of contract and property rights, the adoption of an 
ecological model beginning in the 1970s reimagined tort and criminal law. 
Munn v. Illinois25 relied for its analysis on the image of grain elevators 
standing at the “gateway” to a “toll” road of commerce.26  In later cases, the 
                                                          
 21.  Id. at 393–94.  
 22.  See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916) (discussing 
negligence liability of an auto manufacturer and noting that “the more probable the danger the 
greater the need of caution”). 
 23.  317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
 24.  See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2000) (1977); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S 
HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013); 
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991). 
 25.  94 U.S. 113 (1876).  
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idea of extended consequences increasingly took on the clothing of natural-
istic metaphors exemplified in the phrase “the stream of commerce.”  The 
analogy of economic activity to the flow of a stream both naturalizes and, 
by extension, valorizes the market system.  At the same time, the adoption 
of naturalistic metaphors conveys the notion that what is released into the 
“stream” at one point will affect the rest of the downstream flow, and this 
extended conception of consequences was precisely at stake in the expan-
sion of government’s authority to regulate economic activities.  In private 
law, this model of outward-rippling waves of causation was developed in 
new doctrines of “foreseeability,” by which actors would be required to 
foresee the consequences of their actions and to guard against them up to 
some arbitrary limit of probabilistic predictability. 
“Foreseeability” was not a new idea in American law.  In late-
nineteenth-century private law, foreseeability was employed by courts to 
limit liability (for example, the doctrine of contributory negligence).27  In 
the twentieth century, however, the concept took on entirely new meaning.  
The connection between defining the boundary between public and private 
and determining the scope of government policy forced American courts to 
move into areas that challenged the traditional categories of legal thinking.  
In playing this quasi-policymaking role, courts have had to wrestle with 
problems of fitting traditional concepts of evidence and proof to the prob-
lems of balancing public benefits with private interests.  “Foreseeability” 
became the key point of connection between private rights and public poli-
cy.  In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,28 Judge Cardozo described a 
standard of “unreasonable hazard” based on knowledge of circumstances 
and “ordinary vigilance” that  defined the court-mandated duties.  Applied 
to corporations, these “private” duties took on both the function and the 
form of a scheme of regulation. 
The difficulty with Judge Cardozo’s approach is that the definition of 
unreasonable hazard in terms of foreseeable consequences was something 
entirely unrecognizable from a common law perspective that appealed to 
the common understanding of the community.  As noted earlier, by the 
1920s, courts had begun to wrestle in earnest with prevalent social scientific 
understandings that emphasized interconnectivity in social interactions and 
the idea of economic systems.  Assumptions about the commonplace under-
standing of terms like “cause” were threatened by these increasingly sophis-
ticated modes of analysis.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, in particular, wrestled 
with the tension between new ways of conceiving foreseeable consequences 
                                                          
 26.  Id. at 132. 
 27.  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992). 
 28. 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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and his conviction that legal liability should flow only from morally culpa-
ble conduct.  An enthusiastic supporter of incorporating probabilistic and 
statistical reasoning into legal reasoning, Justice Holmes promoted a stand-
ard of “foreseeability” that extended to whole industries and classes of per-
son.29  Conversely, he recognized that without a limiting principle of 
blameworthiness—that persons should only be held liable for failing to 
foresee consequences where such a failure was unreasonable—“any act 
would be sufficient, however remote, which set in motion or opened the 
door for a series of physical sequences ending in damage.”30 
The most profound alteration in the meaning of foreseeability, and 
consequently in the reach of courts’ public, quasi-regulatory function, was 
the introduction of the language of ecology in the 1970s, a process whose 
beginning in public discourse can probably be marked at the publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.31  From that time forward, an ecological 
model of hazard has become pervasive in political vocabulary.  The incor-
poration into law of such a sophisticated understanding of causation, tradi-
tional in the natural sciences for a century, was absolutely necessary in light 
of the far-reaching consequences of modern technologies.  But the incorpo-
ration of such vocabularies threatens the stability of traditional categories of 
legal thought inherited from an earlier age.32  Consciousness of the possibil-
ity of harms created through ecological processes of causation removed all 
conceptual limits from the legal translation of private injuries into claims of 
public good in both public and private law. 
In public law, an exemplar of the ecological model of causation is a 
statutory scheme such as the Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA,” also known as the “Superfund” law).33  Un-
der CERCLA, government agencies and private plaintiffs would not have to 
demonstrate the specific act that led to the specific presence of a specific 
pollutant; instead, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant had 
released the pollutant in question into the environment in such a way that 
the particular sample could have come from that source.  The costs of clean-
up would be spread among those defendants who were shown to have 
“caused” the pollution in this characteristically ecological sense of the word 
                                                          
 29.  DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 109 
(1995). 
 30.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 76–77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
1963) (1881). 
 31.  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 32.  For a discussion of both the acceptance and the limitations placed by courts on the use of 
epidemiological evidence, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 126–34 (1995). 
 33.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–28 (2012). 
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“cause.”  Other environmental statutes followed similar approaches to de-
termining causation.34 
The ecological model of causation affected private law, as well, 
spreading far beyond consideration of the natural environment to become 
the basis for the discovery of bases of liability for exposure to secondhand 
smoke, including the conclusion that exposure to such smoke constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of “current standards of decen-
cy.”35  Ecological models of causation have been at the heart of “market 
share” theories of liability that would hold drug or gun manufacturers liable 
for their participation in markets that, taken as a whole, create an environ-
ment of risk to vulnerable plaintiffs, and as well the basis for arguments that 
certain forms of speech are analogous to toxic pollutants of the political en-
vironment.36  Robert George’s argument for restrictions on pornography il-
lustrates the spread of the ecological metaphor beyond its original, biologi-
cal sense: 
 What is true of public health and safety is equally true of public 
morals.  Take, as an example, the problem of pornography.  Ma-
terial designed to appeal to the prurient interest in sex by arousing 
carnal desire . . . damages a community’s moral ecology in ways 
analogous to those in which carcinogenic smoke spewing from a 
factory’s stacks damages the community’s physical ecology.37 
The cases involving the harms of secondhand smoke are among the 
most interesting exemplars of particular ways of thinking about harm, cau-
sation, and public duties.  Significantly, regardless of the outcomes, courts 
considering these claims have treated the harmful effects of secondhand 
smoke to be a matter of public consciousness rather than a matter requiring 
expert demonstration.  These harmful effects “seem clear to a large propor-
tion of the population,” observed the Seventh Circuit.38 “[S]tandards of de-
cency are indeed ‘evolving’ on the issue of smoking.”39  A district court in 
New York declared that the failure of prison officials to enforce existing 
                                                          
 34.  The Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation and Liability Act is essentially a statu-
tory enactment that takes the form of tort liability.  In addition, much of the action in Superfund 
litigation involves the invocation of state common law tort theories of recovery, which are gener-
ally permitted in such litigation.  One unfortunate historical result of this approach has been in-
consistency in the formulation of standards for liability and remedies.  See Howard Schweber, 
Cleaning up the System: The Need for Federal Preemption of Third Party Contribution Claims 
Under CERCLA, 12 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J., 187 (1993). 
 35.  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).   
 36.  See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2000); Am. Booksellers’ 
Ass’n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 844 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Sindell v. Abbott Lab, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 37.  ROBERT P. GEORGE, CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN 
CRISIS 92 (2001). 
 38.  Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 157 (7th Cir. 1996).   
 39.  Id. at 160. 
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bans on smoking, “in light of the numerous commentaries and government 
reports concerning [environmentally transmitted smoke], cannot be said to 
be objectively reasonable.”40  In some cases in which courts concluded that 
employees have a right to a smoke-free workplace, no evidence was taken 
on the issue of risk at all; instead, the harmfulness of secondhand smoke 
was treated as a matter for “judicial notice,” a rule permitting courts to give 
cognizance to commonly known facts that are neither in dispute in the case 
nor matters for contention in the public mind.41  And beginning in the 
1990s, the possibility of exposure to secondhand smoke has been recog-
nized as a relevant factor in determining child custody.42 
The model of ecological harms appears with a vengeance in cases in 
which state authorities seek to regulate the conduct of pregnant women, in-
cluding instances involving the dangers of smoking as well as drinking al-
cohol or using drugs.43  In pursuing their mandate to determine acceptable 
standards of conduct, courts’ adoption of ecological models of causation 
makes it much harder to argue that a given area of conduct deserves the ex-
ceptional status of “private.” 
Returning, again, to the early examples of aggressive intervention in 
the 1990s consider the case of “Angela M.W.”44  Angela’s obstetrician dis-
covered evidence of drug use while she was pregnant.  That statement alone 
requires some consideration.  Constructions of both responsible social prac-
tice and the technological enhancement to the disciplinary gaze of the med-
ical community are invoked.  As a matter of social practice, prenatal visits 
to a medical professional are to be encouraged, because of the recognition 
that interventions may be required to ensure that future citizens are not 
harmed by imperfections in fetal environments.  At the same time, the oc-
currence of a prenatal visit creates a moment of potentially unwanted visi-
bility as a result of technologies that permit doctors to observe and evaluate 
a range of environmental circumstances.  Part of the point of conceiving an 
“ecology” is that the interrelationships among events are not thought of as 
the mysterious outcomes of a “black box” but rather as explicable, visualiz-
able elements of the environment.  Advances in visualization technologies 
in the 1990s, such as ultrasound and amniocentesis, played a role in con-
necting the idea of a fetal environment to an ecological conception of causa-
tion and harm by rendering events inside the womb literally or metaphori-
                                                          
 40.  Warren v. Keane, 937 F. Supp. 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).   
 41.  Smith v. W. Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Shimp v. N. J. Bell Tel. Co., 
368 A.2d 408, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).  
 42.  Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994). 
 43.  See, e.g., LAURY OAKS, SMOKING AND PREGNANCY: THE POLITICS OF FETAL 
PROTECTION 171–88 (2001).  
 44.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d, 561 
N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1995). 
 2015] LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES 221 
cally visible, hence potentially accessible to the public.45  Today it is essen-
tially taken for granted that with the application of technology, the course of 
a pregnancy is “public” because it is visible. 
The trial court ruled that the seizure was justified by the imminent risk 
of harm to the child created by the expectant mother’s use of cocaine, and 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the verdict.  The Court of Appeals 
based its conclusion in part on “the admonition . . . that the common law 
should be flexible enough to adopt itself to current medical and scientific 
truths.”46  It must be emphasized that the crucial point was not that Ange-
la’s drug use was illegal—that would be a matter for a criminal trial—but 
that her conduct, whatever its legality or illegality, constituted an “extreme 
situation” of a future child’s exposure to foreseeable harms.  In an earlier 
era, Holmes observed that setting fire to one’s own house with the result 
that a neighbor’s house is burned is counted as arson.  “If that may be the 
effect of setting fire to things which a man has a right to burn . . . why, on 
principle, should it not be the effect of any other act which is equally likely 
under the surrounding circumstances to cause . . . harm?”47 
When Angela M.W.’s case came to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the 
decision was overturned on the narrow ground that the child protection stat-
ute was not intended to include a fetus.  That same point of statutory con-
struction was the basis for decision in Wisconsin v. Deborah J.Z., the case 
with which this Paper began.  Following these rulings, the Wisconsin state 
legislature enacted an explicit authorization for the detention of pregnant 
women in future like cases.48 
In recent years, there has been a spate of new criminal prosecutions 
based on allegations of misconduct by pregnant women that risks endanger-
ing the welfare of a future born child.49  Many of these cases involve at-
tempts to criminalize abortion, others involve a perceived new front in the 
war on drugs.  But their logic is based on the same ecological reasoning that 
                                                          
 45.  See ROBERTA H. BLANK, MOTHER AND FETUS: CHANGING NOTIONS OF MATERNAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1992); RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL 
IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA (1999); Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Dis-
course of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 47 (1997).  
 46.  State ex rel. Angela M.W, 541 N.W.2d at 488.  
 47.  Holmes, supra note 30, at 54.  
 48.  See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2015) (adopted 1997) (“Jurisdiction over unborn 
children in need of protection or services and the expectant mothers of those unborn children.  The 
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over an unborn child alleged to be in need of protection or 
services which can be ordered by the court whose expectant mother habitually lacks self-control in 
the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a 
severe degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn 
child, and of the child when born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant 
mother receives prompt and adequate treatment for that habitual lack of self-control.  The court 
also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the expectant mother of an unborn child described in 
this section.”). 
 49.  See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 2, at 305–09. 
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sees “foreseeable risk” as the basis for public intervention into what would 
otherwise be private conduct.  If it is not possible to articulate legal princi-
ples that define when the state may regulate the conduct of pregnant wom-
en, there equally will be no principled way to argue that a given attempt at 
intervention has exceeded the bounds of such a definition.  Furthermore, 
there is no obvious reason why pregnancy should be the event that triggers 
the state’s recognition of consequences, and hence of a state interest.  Nutri-
tion, work environments, or chemical exposures occurring well prior to 
conception can plausibly be argued to create risks of negative consequences 
for subsequently created children. 
The argument is not purely hypothetical.  In 1991, a California court 
considered a claim of liability for harms caused to an eventual fetus by inju-
ries sustained in a car accident two years prior to conception.  Confronted 
by that claim, Judge Woods of the Court of Appeals was moved to observe, 
“through hindsight, everything is foreseeable.”50  The Court of Appeals up-
held a ruling by the trial court that the duty of care could not extend to a 
point in time prior to the existence of a fetus, but that decision is no more or 
less logically consistent with an ecological model of harms than the oppo-
site conclusion would have been, particularly in cases involving exposure to 
hazardous substances rather than violent events.51 
III.  “WE MUST LIVE ON THE NETWORK” 
At one time, economic transactions were conceived as affecting only 
those in privity with one another, those immediately involved in the event.  
Later, the idea was accepted that each transaction occurs within a complex 
system of economic markets, and each event has consequences that extend 
throughout that system.  The external stimulus for this new way of thinking 
was new forms of economic activity and the prominence of new, social sci-
entific ways of describing behavior in “the economy.”  Once introduced, the 
language of markets and systems extended beyond its original context of 
economic behavior and affected reasoning about a range of social and phys-
ical conditions. 
                                                          
 50.  Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 51.  A commonly discussed example is the issue of whether it is desirable to prevent women 
of childbearing age from being exposed to lead.  The Center for Disease Control is unequivocal: 
“Primary and secondary prevention of lead exposure among females of childbearing age is needed 
to avert neurobehavioral and cognitive deficits in their offspring.”  Ctrs. for Disease Control, Lead 
Exposure Among Females of Childbearing Age—United States, 2004, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. (Apr. 27, 2007), www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5616a4.htm.  Where 
private employers attempt to create such policies, however, issues of gender discrimination may 
arise.  See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).  In contrast, Eu-
ropean courts have found that national policies preventing women of childbearing age from work-
ing in environments characterized by exposure to lead or radiation are permissible.  See LENIA 
SAMUEL, FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS: CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 234–
35 (2d ed. 2002). 
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At one time, conduct that did not immediately cause injury to an iden-
tifiable individual was assumed to be self-regarding.  Later the idea was ac-
cepted that the well-being of ecologies as well as economies are affected by 
the ripple effects of localized events.  The stimulus for this new way of 
thinking was the increasingly visible consequences of widespread deploy-
ment of chemical agents into the physical environment, and a biological 
sciences-based political movement that promoted new ways of describing 
harms to “the environment.”  Once introduced, models of ecological causa-
tion and harm extended beyond their original context of pollution to de-
scribe a wide range of activities having to do with health and welfare. 
Each of these shifts in thinking had dramatic consequences for the le-
gal construction of the public/private divide.  Private law doctrines of tort 
liability, the scope of public regulation, and constitutional analysis all were 
affected by the extension of the consequentialist model of “public” by the 
adoption of new models of thinking about consequences.  The basic liberal 
calculus of balancing consequences to others against the intrusion on per-
sonal autonomy remains the same, but in each case the underlying concep-
tion of “consequences” underwent a profound change.  These are shifts, in 
other words, in legal epistemology, not merely in legal doctrine. 
It is plausible that we presently are living during another moment of 
such an epistemological shift.  This time the expanded system of conse-
quential interactions involves not money or chemicals, but information.  I 
do not mean to focus on the actions of government, for example, spying on 
our cell phone conversations.  Certainly, new surveillance technologies 
drive consideration of old questions in new contexts, whether those tech-
nologies involve microphones or heat sensors.52  But the “threat,” if that is 
the word, to our present model of public and private as those terms relate to 
information may be more easily seen in a less obvious, less ominous ques-
tion.  Assume that at a given moment there is a piece of information about 
me that is legally classified as “private” and consequently subject to various 
constitutional and statutory protections.  What are the consequences for the 
status of that information if I voluntarily share it with someone else? 
The framing of the question reveals that it is based on a way of think-
ing about information and privacy that is increasingly irrelevant to the con-
ditions of modern life.  The phrase “a piece of information” speaks to a 
conception of data as a collection of discrete facts that can be considered 
separately from one another, analogous to traditional forms of property.  In 
                                                          
 52.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  It is interesting to note that Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in that case focused on the question of whether a particular technology 
of surveillance was widely in use such that one could plausibly expect its existence to be factored 
into the assessment of a “reasonable” expectation of privacy.  The application of this principle to 
the Internet raises the disturbing possibility that at some point in the future (if not the present) 
where people conduct a significant portion of their lives online there will be no limits to the gov-
ernment’s utilization of online information.  
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addition, the ideas of “voluntary” and “sharing” are of limited use.  This 
was already evident in the discussion of the cases involving pregnancy, as 
legal and medical requirements of seeking appropriate care meant exposure 
of private information and the technologies of observation made the most 
personal aspects of a pregnant woman’s bodily integrity publicly visible.  
But even in that situation, the issue involved was information about the per-
son.  In the world of cyberspace, the information is the person; rather than 
the selective disclosure of discrete bits of information, what is at issue is the 
public exposure of the entirety of a person’s identity. 
Return to the question of what is the legal significance of voluntarily 
disclosing a piece of personal information.  The traditional answer is that 
once a piece of information is voluntarily shared, it is open to any and all 
use.  There are gray areas, to be sure, forms of disclosure for legally recog-
nized restricted purposes (for example, medical diagnosis and intellectual 
property), but they are special instances that reflect the boundary work in-
volved in maintaining the basic distinction.  The basic, traditional model is 
what might be called the “conversation” model.  I say something to you in a 
conversation, that information is yours.  Just as Mill said, there are social 
conventions against gossip that may limit the use you make of that infor-
mation, but there is no invasion of my legal rights if you choose to repeat 
my words to others.  By the same token, what I say to a reporter, write in a 
blog post, or write on a t-shirt for all to see is information that has passed 
out of my legal sphere of control.  In this traditional approach information 
is treated as a form of property.  When I have voluntarily surrendered own-
ership of an object—as in the case of giving a gift—the recipient now 
“owns” that object.  The key is that I voluntarily chose to share the infor-
mation; for that reason, there is no invasion of “privacy.” 
Part of the assumption of this model is that the circle of shared infor-
mation is localized. But cyberspace is obviously different.  In cyberspace, 
all the information in all the world is joined in a single complex system, a 
“network” that connects communicative acts just as an economy connects 
individual behaviors or an ecology describes the connections among life 
forms occupying a biological system.  The old property ownership-based 
model of public and private communication is severely tested by this devel-
opment, and a new legal epistemology of public and private is needed.  To 
see why, consider cases of revenge pornography and “Squeaky Dolphin.” 
A.  Revenge Pornography 
In 2014, Illinois became the sixteenth state to adopt a law criminaliz-
ing “revenge porn,” the nonconsensual posting of intimate material.53  Un-
like most earlier versions of such statutes adopted in other states, the Illinois 
                                                          
 53.  See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (West 2015).  
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law contains no specific intent requirement, no nudity is required, and the 
statute applies to images created by the victim herself as well as to pictures 
taken by others.  Victims’ advocate and lawyer Carrie Goldberg hailed the 
innovations in the statute: 
 So much is said about how laws butt up against free speech, . . . 
but if we lose the expectation of privacy in taking images meant 
only for someone we trust, then we lose another valuable form of 
speech: our private speech.  There is nothing wrong with taking 
pictures of yourself that are meant only for another person you 
trust.54 
Supporters of the law point to the need to bring the reality of virtual life un-
der scrutiny for its real life consequences: 
 If we’re to tackle the problem, we need to stop viewing the 
[I]nternet as “virtual” reality.  We need to recogni[z]e that the 
[I]nternet is a real, tangible location for rights violations.  For vic-
tims of revenge porn, there is nothing “virtual” about their expe-
rience.  There is nothing “virtual” about moving house, changing 
your name, being stalked, or committing suicide.  Revenge porn 
has struck a vein of misogynist gold, which has found a powerful 
voice on the [I]nternet.  It’s a voice which is no less harmful 
merely because it speaks through a screen.55 
Some commentators have suggested that these cases do not require an-
ything particularly novel in the way of legal responses; application of crim-
inal statutes or an extension of copyright law principles might be suffi-
cient.56  But the larger point is that as far as the legal construction of 
“public” is concerned, the decision to present a loved one with an intimate 
image as a gift is not distinguishable from the decision to appear as the 
model in a centerfold—except that the latter image is subject to greater le-
gal protections by virtue of commercial contracts, copyright, and the pro-
tectable interests of the publisher. 
Both the phenomenon of revenge porn and the very valid concerns that 
it raises point to questions that go beyond the formulation of a prosecutorial 
                                                          
 54.  Barbara Herman, Illinois Passes Revenge Porn Law with Teeth: ‘Other States Should 
Copy,’ Says Privacy Lawyer, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015) http://www.ibtimes.com/illinois-
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strategy.  The real question is how we make sense in a world of global cy-
berspace of established categories of private and public communication.  
The problem is that the technology of communication and reproduction al-
ters the nature, not merely the scale, of the disclosure.  In the past, letters 
could be published, conversations could be repeated, but they could not 
readily be turned into eternal archives of personal exposure available to the 
current and future population of the planet.  Furthermore, it is not an ade-
quate response to say that these are unfortunate side effects of a generally 
valid principle of publicity.  Many of the principled reasons for supporting 
publicity in general make little or no sense in the current context.  “Sunlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants,” said Brandeis, and we understand the 
context of his statement.57  But what does the same sentiment mean in other 
contexts?  Is “disinfection” the only priority?  Is “disinfecting” the only 
thing sunlight does, or should we also be concerned about skin cancer?  
What does “best” mean? 
Consider, for example, the online availability of court filings. In gen-
eral, the idea that court filings should be public documents is rooted in the 
idea that secret court proceedings are instruments of tyranny.  But while 
“publicly available” in an archive means one thing, “publicly available” 
online means something else entirely.  Papers filed in lawsuits have become 
matters of massive public examination, meaning that unsubstantiated alle-
gations, embarrassing details, painful memories, and deeply personal con-
flicts must be available to millions of viewers as a resulting cost of open ac-
cess to the courts.  These unintended forms of publication are not only 
unfair to defendants who may be ultimately found to be blameless, they im-
pose burdens on plaintiffs in the form of unwanted publicity that are having 
the effect of discouraging victims from coming forward.58  The equation of 
values that made sense of the old idea that a voluntary release of infor-
mation for a particular purpose made that information “public” does not 
seem to adequately capture the concerns of the Internet age. 
Unwanted, unanticipated, and massive publicity is only one side of the 
coin.  Another side is the fact that the Internet, despite its information hier-
archies and security protocols, is ultimately one network.  That means that 
it is not only information that is released, it is patterns of information, or in-
formation about the release of information. 
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B.  Total Identity and Squeaky Dolphin 
Among the many (known and as yet unknown) government and pri-
vate projects aimed at collecting and analyzing data about individuals, one 
stands out as an illustration of the idea of this paper.  The SuperIdentity 
Project is a joint effort of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific North-
west National Laboratory and six British universities.59  It is headquartered 
at the University of Southampton.  The idea of the project is to take the par-
tial bits of identifying information that appear in different places and put 
them together to create a core “superidentity” that not only enables observ-
ers to track individuals as they move across different social media or cyber-
netic locations, but actually determines the authentic core of the identity of 
the person.  “The assumption underlying this project is that, whilst there 
may be many dimensions to an identity—some more stable than others—all 
should ultimately refer back to a single core identity—the source or ‘su-
peridentity.’”60 
The program explicitly draws on psychological theories and combines 
multiple forms of measurement—biometric, biographic, and cybermetric—
to create an identity profile.  For example, the personality characteristic of 
‘extroversion’ might predict a long stride length or hand gestures, firm 
pressure in a mobile phone swipe gesture or keystroke depression, or a large 
online presence with multiple friend sets in multiple cyberspace locations.  
By combining these bits of information into a psychological profile, the in-
dividual’s superidentity, as individual as a fingerprint, can ultimately be 
constructed.61  Moreover, although these psychological profiles do not 
make it possible to track known suspects, they can be used to predict poten-
tial criminal or terrorist activity.  As Peter Galison puts it, “the race is on to 
anticipate other future preferences and actions from crimes, voting, and da-
ting to terrorism.”62  As the NSA memorandum introducing the program 
announced, “we must live on the network.”63 
                                                          
 59.  See SuperIdentity: About the Project, UNIV. OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
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One particularly interesting part of the SuperIdentity Project is 
Squeaky Dolphin.  Squeaky Dolphin is a program that collects information 
across social media by using identified stable personality traits as markers.  
This is part tracking and part projecting; patterns of psychological traits de-
rived from observation lead to superidentity markers that make it possible 
to track people across social media, from which multiple observations are 
then fed back into the superidentity model. 
What makes Squeaky Dolphin so interesting is the proposition that, in 
conjunction with the larger project, it enables the analysts to know their 
subjects better than they know themselves.  That is, the superidentity is con-
structed by bringing together the fractured identities that individuals em-
body (irony intended) in their online persona.  It is commonplace for indi-
viduals to “be” one person on Facebook, another on a dating site, a third 
and fourth in other areas of their lives.  The advent of the Internet in this 
way only accelerated a phenomenon that has been associated with moderni-
ty by sociologists and social psychologists for decades.  But a superidentity 
is the inescapable core of our being that lurks beneath all the different exer-
cises in self-expression. 
None of the elements of the SuperIdentity Project represent an “inva-
sion of privacy” in its classic sense.  All of this depends on the collection of 
information that the individual has willingly shared with the world, it is on-
ly the particular use to which the information is put that is disquieting.  Re-
venge porn presents the spectacle of willingly shared information unwill-
ingly made public; Squeaky Dolphin points toward the spectacle of 
information unknowingly made public, and even unknown to the very indi-
vidual involved.  If there is a desire to conceive of a legal public/private 
barrier that identifies something “wrong” with the Squeaky Dolphin pro-
gram it cannot depend on the question of whether there was consent in the 
conversational model.  The revenge porn case at least involves a situation of 
a conversation under expected conditions of privacy, and perhaps it can be 
reached by an extension of something like copyright doctrine prohibiting 
nonconsensual use of images created with an expectation of privacy.  But 
that formulation does not begin to touch Squeaky Dolphin, let alone the 
next generational iteration of this form of behavioral profiling or the one af-
ter that.  Just as we learned to accept that economic behavior occurs within 
a larger market, and the release of chemicals occurs within a biological eco-
system, we are learning that our identities and our acts of self-expression 
take place on a network whether we want them to or not. 
IV.  THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE RECONSIDERED AGAIN: AN EMERGENT 
LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
The theme of this Paper has been that change in the understanding of 
the public/private divide reflects a shift in legal epistemology.  In the case 
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of the network, the shift is from information as a form of property to infor-
mation as an element of identity.  The idea has been taken up by a number 
of individuals and groups considering the impact of networked information 
on legal thinking.  The Future of Identity in the Information Society 
(“FIDIS”) is a “Network of Excellence,” a nonlocal academic consortium 
established by the European Council.64  In a booklet titled Identy in a Net-
worked World, FIDIS provides a provocative illustration of their argument 
in an essay and in a graphic representation.65  The essay explains the idea 
that “John” should have control over the aspects of his information that 
make up his total identity, and subsequent resharing or retransmission of 
that information ought not to be allowed.  The governments involved, 
FIDIS argues, have an affirmative obligation to establish legal regimes to 
make this possible. 
As a legal proposition, the model in the FIDIS illustration is wildly al-
ien to standard American understandings.  But the basic conceptual ele-
ments are not.  The idea of an affirmative state obligation to provide a 
meaningful form of “privacy” has been raised by numerous political and le-
gal theorists in the context of a feminist critique of the inadequacies of a 
model of privacy as merely negative liberty.66  As Zillah Eisenstein puts it, 
“[t]he dilemma of privacy is that the state should not have the last word on 
who gets to have privacy, and yet the state must play a role in affirming its 
actual availability.”67  Speaking from a neorepublican perspective, Patricia 
Boling emphasizes that citizens need political and private categories of life 
as “important parts of the process of nurturing democratic citizens,”68 an 
argument that echoes Jean Bethke Elshtain’s emphasis on the private sphere 
as “a locus of human activity, moral reflection, social and historical rela-
tions, the creation of meaning, and the construction of identity having its 
own integrity.”69 
In legal discourse, European courts have begun to wrestle with alterna-
tive ways of thinking about the public/private divide in ways that go farther 
to take into account the market, ecological, and network understandings of 
“public” than most American courts have yet been willing to go.  There is 
no reference to “privacy” in the European Convention on Human Rights, 
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but Article 8 secures a right to “private life” and other articles mention the 
concept of “private” in passing.70  Article 8’s protections are understood to 
guarantee “a sphere within which [the individual] can freely pursue the de-
velopment and fulfillment of his personality,” the “right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings.”71  Retention of information 
collected in criminal investigations, in turn, is limited to two years.72 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that Article 8 im-
poses affirmative obligations as well as negative limitations on interference: 
[I]n addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private 
life.  These obligations may involve the adoption of measures de-
signed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves. . . .  The boundaries 
between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Arti-
cle 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition.  The applicable 
principles are nonetheless similar.  In particular, in both instances 
regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck be-
tween the competing interests.73 
The phrase “private life” covers “the physical and psychological integ-
rity of a person, . . .  aspects of an individual’s physical and social identi-
ty, . . .  a right to personal development, and the right to establish and de-
velop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”74 
Famously, this flexible right has recently been held to include a “right 
to be forgotten,” established in a European Union Directive75 and applied 
by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) to require private companies such 
as Google to remove links to information on request under appropriate cir-
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cumstance.  The ECJ opinion focused on the issues of information and its 
role in a networked world: 
 The Court observes, furthermore, that this information poten-
tially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and 
that, without the search engine, the information could not have 
been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty.  
Internet users may thereby establish a more or less detailed pro-
file of the person searched against. Furthermore, the effect of the 
interference with the person’s rights is heightened on account of 
the important role played by the internet and search engines in 
modern society, which render the information contained in such 
lists of results ubiquitous.  In the light of its potential seriousness, 
such interference cannot, according to the Court, be justified by 
merely the economic interest which the operator of the engine has 
in the data processing. 
 However, inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of re-
sults could, depending on the information at issue, have effects 
upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially interested 
in having access to that information, the Court holds that a fair 
balance should be sought in particular between that interest and 
the data subject’s fundamental rights, in particular the right to 
privacy and the right to protection of personal data.76 
The idea that seems to be emerging from all of this is something on the 
order of an obligation on the part of governments to create conditions in 
which individuals can engage in “user-controlled identity management.”77  
In the same way that regulation of economic relations created a set of con-
ditions for meaningful economic decisionmaking by workers and consum-
ers, and environmental health regulations give individuals the ability to con-
trol the health qualities of their environment, governments need to have the 
ability to engage in transnational cooperative efforts to create conditions in 
which individuals have the ability to make meaningful decisions about the 
disclosure of their information in the network.  The pregnancy cases remind 
us that new forms of conceiving of the legal consequences of individual 
conduct carry risks of overly intrusive regulation as well as potential bene-
fits.  And the pregnancy cases also remind us that nothing is ever resolved: 
the difficult decisions about the scope of economic and environmental regu-
lation that is consistent with constitutionally guaranteed liberties are with us 
today, and issues arising out of attempts to secure autonomy within a global 
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informational network will likewise raise difficult questions.  But it seems 
evident that the traditional legal epistemology of public and private infor-
mation are inadequate to make sense of the questions posed by the condi-
tions of life on the network.  We are participants in markets, we occupy 
ecologies, and we live on the network. 
